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Comment
IDN rankings and performance: a comment
Dr. Wan and colleagues have produced an impressive
analysis of the performance of integrated health net-
works in the United States. Such studies are very
much needed, especially given the limited research on
IHN performance and the importance of this new
organizational form within the U.S. health care system.
The authors examine the increasingly recognized
SMG top 100 list in an attempt to determine whether
a system’s ranking (by SMG) as an integrated system
correlates with system performance. At the heart of
this study are two key assumptions: 1) that the SMG
ranking methodology is valid and 2) that the entities
included in the ranking are indeed integrated health
networks. We briefly address each of these in this
comment.
Validity of SMG scoring system
With regard to the first assumption, Dr. Wan and col-
leagues are the first to examine the SMG rankings
empirically. And, not unexpectedly, they found no
association between system ranking and performance.
It is important to note that immediately after Modern
Healthcare gave a degree of notoriety to the ranks pro-
duced by SMG, by publishing the top 100 list annually,
the rankings have become a hot item for system mar-
keters. Most of the top-rated IHNs now report their
high rankings prominently on their web pages. Modern
Healthcare has thus provided a kind of ‘‘institutional’’
validation of the scoring system on behalf of a practis-
ing community hungry for positive indicators of suc-
cessful system building and integration.
One example within the data themselves signals pos-
sible validity problems. The top 100 rankings pub-
lished in the year 2000 (we note that only 1998 and
1999 rankings were used in the Wan study) included
the UCSF Stanford Healthcare System. This system
formed in 1997 when the University of California San
Francisco health system merged with the Stanford
University health system. From the very beginning, the
merged entity experienced significant financial and
organizational difficulties. The continuing problems
were so severe that they voted just two years later, in
1999, to undo their merger. Despite the problems and
after their having fallen apart, SMG still included them
in the top 100 ranking (ranked 64th). Admittedly, this
is but one case. But it is emblematic of the problem
inherent in promulgating a system for ranking perform-
ance that has not been subjected to external testing
(until, of course, the Wan and colleagues study) and
appears, for all intent and purposes, to serve more as
a marketing tool than a resource designed for schol-
arship. Accordingly, it seems reasonable to suggest
that until further research validates the SMG scoring
system, the research community should probably
refrain from treating the rankings as indicators of rel-
ative levels of health system integration.
Does SMG measure IHNs?
This leads to the second assumption—that the entities
ranked by SMG and examined by Wan and colleagues
are actually IHNs. This is not an easy assumption to
check out, primarily because there are no validated
databases or accepted definitions or measures of
IHNs w6x. We note that the definition offered by Wan
and colleagues is consistent with many others found
in the literature: ‘‘Recent major trends in health care
systems have been (1) to provide all elements of the
care continuum from health insurance, outpatient and
inpatient services to long-term health maintenance,
and (2) to develop system-wide integration of admin-
istration, clinical care, information technology, and
financing.’’ These two elements—(1) comprehensive
service delivery, perhaps combined with the provision
of health insurance, (2) and integration across those
service elements—are generally considered to be cen-
tral to the concept of an IHN. Given well-recognized
difficulties inherent in vertical integration w8x, the
requirement that IHNs combine provider and insur-
ance businesses is often relaxed in practice. In the
1990s, the period in which great attention was given
to IDN development, only a small number of systems
successfully combined insurance and delivery. It is
also common to assume that IHNs join physicians and
hospitals into integrated systems. However, since
many of the hospital-based systems that ventured into
this risky arena lost money as a result, many have sold
off their physician practices w3, 4x.
The 1990s experimentation with IHN formation, how-
ever, did produce a significant number of very large,
highly complex and often dominating health care sys-
tems. Most that formed in that period were hospital-
based. And while few of these successfully integrated
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classified (through self designations or labels given to
them by data collection companies) as IHNs. The
essential characteristics that qualify these as IHNs are
their overall complexity (they often involve combina-
tions of two or more hospitals, for example) and the
fact that they combine service capacity at the local
level. It is only locally that the integration of clinical
resources and services is possible. Indeed, the very
idea of clinical integration was first promulgated by
those systems that had already developed substantial
system capacity within local markets w1, 2, 5x. The 90s
thus became the period in which local system integra-
tion was fully conceptualized as well as pursued stra-
tegically, by hospitals across the country.
The result of the 90s revolution in system formation
changed the landscape of health care in the United
States very dramatically. A few statistics exemplify the
consequence of system formation in that period. In
1989, just prior to the major restructuring that
occurred, about 28 percent of urban hospital bed
capacity was involved in local combinations of two or
more hospitals w7x. By the year 2000, which comes
after the merger and acquisition movement had settled
down, the percentage doubled, rising to 59% w9x. The
number of local urban hospital clusters reached
around 465 in 2000, the clusters ranging in size from
two hospitals (representing 52% of the clusters) to 18
hospitals.
As a result of the restructuring, local hospital markets
became very concentrated (see figure 1). In the year
2000, for example, the average market shares for the
top four firms per urban market, by size of market,
was: 99% for markets of 250,000 and less; 93% for
markets between 250,000 and less than a million; and
73% for markets that are one million or larger w9x. The
four firm ratio for non-urban markets (where no more
than one or two hospitals are likely to be present),
commonly reaches 100%. Overall, therefore, the vast
majority of markets are dominated by a small number
of hospital firms, many of which are local clusters. It
is thus very clear that the so-called IHN movement
produced some significant changes in the structure of
urban health care markets.
The question then is this: are these (and other local
system types) tracked in the SMG database? Many of
the local systems are in fact counted by SMG. For
example, as pointed out in the Wan and colleagues
paper, SMG lists the Henry Ford Health System as an
IHN. Henry Ford is an excellent example of a local,
multi-hospital, multi-service system. Unfortunately, in
addition to such local systems, SMG also counts as
IDNs a number of systems that should not be counted
as such. Most critically, they include as IHNs a number
of multi-market, multi-hospital, and systems as well.
Examining their 2000 list of top 100 IDNs, we note that
nearly half (46%) of the so-called IHNs ranked by
SMG were actually multi-market systems. For exam-
ple, Banner Healthcare, which is ranked  72 in the
list of IDNs, is a large not for profit system that owns
hospitals stretching from Arizona to North Dakota.
Likewise, Intermountain Health Care, Sutter Health,
Trinity Health, and others were so classified, but they
each reach well beyond single markets. It is true that
many of these run IDNs locally—for instance, a Ban-
ner cluster in Phoenix and one in Salt Lake City run
by Intermountain. However, the local clusters within
these are not separately identified by SMG. It is inter-
esting to note that SMG does separately identify within
its top 100 a cluster owned by Tenet, the second larg-
est for profit system in this country—Tenet of Fort Lau-
derdale. But this tends to be the exception, not the rule
for their handling of multi-market companies. SMG
also includes as IDNs a number of freestanding hos-
pitals that have self-identified as IDNs.
A few other companies provide data on IHNs. In addi-
tion to the American Hospital Association, which is the
most widely used source of data by health services
researchers, several proprietary companies provide
health care market data. Most of these formed in the
1990s to service pharmaceutical and other supply and
distribution companies. These include: USLifeline
(owned by Medical Distribution Solutions, Inc.), MDI,
MCIC, and Dorenfest & Associates. Of these, only
USLifeline distinguishes the local clusters from the
multi-market system types. In addition, the Williamson
Institute, which is located at the Virginia Common-
wealth University, has for years tracked both multi-
market and local market hospital combinations, each
type separately. None of these sources, however,
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systems combine hospital, physician and other provid-
ers as well as insurance products). The vertical form,
of course, constitutes the fullest expression of the IDN
concept.
Conclusions
Wan and colleagues have provided an important serv-
ice to the research community by examining whether
or not the popular rankings created by SMG actually
reflect degrees of integration that would be associated
with levels of system performance. They found little
evidence of any such association. We point out in this
commentary that no serious testing of the validity of
the system for ranking IDNs by SMG has been con-
ducted, nor is SMG consistent in what it designates as
IDNs in its database.
We simply lack a reliable, valid and current database
on the more recently formed IDNs. This is very unfor-
tunate, as the IDN (or the various permutations of
complex health care systems that have formed) rep-
resents the most significant new organizational form to
have emerged in the hospital industry in a century.
Given their size, complexity and local power, as well
as their newness as organizational forms, there is a
critical need for research into these entities. We need
to understand the organizational variations that exist
among the IDNs. We need to know what factors are
associated with IDN structure and strategy. And we
need to know whether the combinations of health care
capacity at the local market level do indeed improve
the quality, efficiency andyor access to care, over what
is possible by the traditional unstructured ‘‘system’’
arrangements. In effect, we need more work of the
kind conducted by Wan and associates, but hopefully
research that draws on reliable and valid databases of
local health systems.
Roice D. Luke, Ph.D.
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